

Supplementary Information for:

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

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SECTION 1: LONGITUDINAL MEASUREMENT INVARIANCE OF THE SIX-ITEM VERSION OF POLITICAL TRUST	2
ANALYSIS STRATEGY	2
RESULTS	3
SECTION 2: EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSES ON COLLECTIVE ACTION	6
SECTION 3: MODEL DIAGNOSTIC	9
NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME	9
LOCAL ELECTION OUTCOME	13
SECTION 4: ANALYSES WITH PRE-REGISTERED MEASURE OF TRUST	15
NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME	15
LOCAL ELECTION OUTCOME	17
SECTION 5: ANALYSES WITH INGROUP PARTY TRUST	19
NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME	19
LOCAL ELECTION OUTCOME	21
SECTION 6: ANALYSES WITH COVARIATES	23
NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME	23
LOCAL ELECTION OUTCOME	25
SECTION 7: ANALYSES WITH NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME WITH LOCAL DATASET	27
SECTION 8: ANALYSES WITH DICHOTOMOUS SCORE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION	29
NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME	29
LOCAL ELECTION OUTCOME	31
SECTION 9: ANALYSES WITH RASCH SCORE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION	33
NATIONAL ELECTION OUTCOME	33
LOCAL ELECTION OUTCOME	35


Section 1: Longitudinal measurement invariance of the six-item version of political trust

Analysis Strategy

Following the literature on invariance analysis three levels of invariance were analyzed by comparing three nested models: configural, metric and scalar (Davidov et al., 2014). Following Mackinnon et al. (2022)'s procedure for longitudinal invariance analyses, the configural model is a confirmatory factorial model (CFA) in which the internal structure of the scale (one-factor) is designed per each wave (two waves), and where items' residuals are allowed to covariate with the residuals of the corresponding items in the following waves (Figure S1 represents the corresponding factorial model). The metric model is the same as the configural but constraining loadings to be equal with their corresponding loadings across waves. The scalar model is the same as the metric but constraining intercepts to be equal across waves. Models' comparisons followed this order: first the comparison between configural and metric models, then the comparison between metric and scalar models. Decisions were made by looking at fit indexes (CFI, RMSEA, SRMR), model differences in parsimony indexes (ΔAIC and ΔBIC) and the Chi-square difference tests. Configural invariance was corroborated when fit indexes were acceptable for the configural model. Metric invariance was corroborated when fit indexes were acceptable for both configural and metric models, when there was improvement or not relevant difference in parsimony indexes (ΔAIC and $\Delta BIC < |6|$) relative to the configural, and when the Chi-square difference between configural and metric models was not significant at $p < .001$ (this significance threshold was chosen given the sensibility of this test when applied to large samples). Scalar invariance was corroborated applying the same criteria but in comparison with the metric model. If one level of measurement invariance is not corroborated, the analysis does not continue to the following.

Figure S1

Design of the CFA representing the model that was tested for the invariance measurement analysis.



Note. The configural was not constrained, the metric constrained loadings to be equal across waves T1 and T2 and the scalar constrained loadings and intercepts to be equal.

Results

The configural model (in which loadings were not constrained) showed that loadings were similar across the two waves and that all items strongly loaded the factor in their respective wave (Table S1). Strong evidence for the configural invariance was found as fit indexes were good to acceptable (*Robust CFI* = .97, *Robust RMSEA* = .08, *Robust SRMR* = .03). Findings also corroborated metric invariance as the model showed very similar fit indexes relative to the configural (*Robust CFI* = .97, *Robust RMSEA* = .08, *Robust SRMR* = .05), improvement or not relevant difference in parsimony ($\Delta AIC = 2.9$, $\Delta BIC = -27.4$) and the Chi-square test was not significant at $p < .001$ ($\Delta \chi^2 = 18.13$, $df = 7$, $p = .011$). Contrasting

evidence was found for the scalar invariance: the scalar model showed good CFI and SRMR but unsatisfactory RMSEA (*Robust CFI* = .95, *Robust RMSEA* = .09, *Robust SRMR* = .06), relevant loss in parsimony relative to the metric model ($\Delta\text{AIC} = 326.75$, $\Delta\text{BIC} = 30.8$), and significant Chi-square difference ($\Delta\chi^2=69.00$, $df = 6$, $p<.001$). All these results are summed in Table S2.

Table S1

Longitudinal invariance analysis of the one-factor six-item measure of political trust across the two waves: confirmatory factorial analysis of the configural model.

	Standardised loadings of the configural model	
	T1	T2
PolTrust1R. <i>UK politicians are mainly in politics for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the community.</i>	.68	.68
PolTrust3. <i>Most members of the UK parliament can be trusted to defend the interests of their constituents</i>	.72	.83
PolTrust4. <i>Most members of the UK parliament are honest.</i>	.81	.86
Trust_parliam. <i>The UK Parliament^a.</i>	.82	.88
Trust_local. <i>Your local council (i.e., town or city or district)^a.</i>	.60	.62
Trust_politic. <i>Politicians in general^a.</i>	.91	.90

Note. Loading statistics were standardised.

^a The instruction for these items was: “And how much do you trust or distrust the following groups or institutions?”

Table S2

Longitudinal invariance analysis of the one-factor six-item measure of political trust across the two waves: comparison between configural, metric and scalar models.

	Model		
	Configural	Metric	Scalar
Robust CFI	.97	.97	.95
Raw AIC	19419.83	19422.73	19479.48
Δ AIC	/	2.9	326.75
Raw BIC	19605.78	19578.41	19609.21
Δ BIC	/	-27.34	30.8
Robust SRMR	.03	.05	.06
Robust RMSEA	.08	.08	.09
$\Delta \chi^2$ (p-value)	/	18.13 ($p = .011$)	69.00 ($p < .001$)

Note. Bold font for the indexes indicates the highest level of invariance that is possible to corroborate according to the employed index. $\Delta\chi^2$ test values are calculated between the current column model and the preceding column model. Δ AIC and Δ BIC are calculated as the difference between raw indices of the current column and raw indices of the preceding column model.

Section 2: Exploratory Factor Analyses on Collective Action

Table S3

Frequency Distribution of Participants' Engagement in Collective Action

Number of collective actions	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
<i>n</i>	383	87	43	20	7	1	1	0	1	0	0	0

Table S4

Result of the EFA on Tetrachoric Correlation Matrix with All Items (Including Filler, item 5, and "Other", item 13)

Item	Factor Loading (λ)	Communality (h^2)	Uniqueness (u^2)
Signed a petition	0.59	0.35	0.65
Joined a political party	0.44	0.19	0.81
Written to an MP or councillor	0.51	0.26	0.74
Taken part in a demonstration or protest	0.52	0.27	0.73
Watched a TV discussion about the election	0.40	0.16	0.84
Tried to persuade people to vote for one party (e.g. by canvassing)	0.67	0.45	0.55
Showed posters or stickers to show your support	0.50	0.25	0.75
Supported a social media campaign (e.g. shared, liked or commented)	0.68	0.46	0.54
Opposed or criticised a social media campaign	0.62	0.39	0.61
Written to a newspaper	0.46	0.21	0.79
Volunteer to help organising the political campaign	0.79	0.63	0.37
Made a donation to a politician	0.80	0.64	0.36

Other	0.31	0.09	0.91
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Note. SS loadings = 4.35; proportion of variance explained = 0.33. Factor loadings, communalities, and uniqueness were estimated using maximum likelihood on a tetrachoric correlation matrix.

Table S5*Result of the EFA on Tetrachoric Correlation Matrix on Final 11 Items*

Item	Factor Loading (λ)	Communality (h^2)	Uniqueness (u^2)
Signed a petition	0.58	0.33	0.67
Joined a political party	0.45	0.21	0.79
Written to an MP or councillor	0.49	0.24	0.76
Taken part in a demonstration or protest	0.50	0.25	0.75
Tried to persuade people to vote for one party (e.g. by canvassing)	0.67	0.44	0.56
Showed posters or stickers to show your support	0.52	0.27	0.73
Supported a social media campaign (e.g. shared, liked or commented)	0.74	0.54	0.46
Opposed or criticised a social media campaign	0.65	0.42	0.58
Written to a newspaper	0.44	0.20	0.80
Volunteer to help organising the political campaign	0.76	0.58	0.42
Made a donation to a politician	0.80	0.65	0.35

Note. SS loadings = 4.13; proportion of variance explained = 0.38. Factor loadings, communalities, and uniqueness were estimated using maximum likelihood on a tetrachoric correlation matrix. Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$, 95% CI [.70, .95], McDonald's $\omega = .87$

Section 3: Model Diagnostic

Residual diagnostics were conducted using the DHARMA package (Hartig, 2025) in R (version 4.2.1; R Core Team, 2022) for both national and local models to assess model fit.

National Election Outcome

For the national model (see Figure S2), the dispersion test indicated no over- or under-dispersion (dispersion = 0.993, $p = .924$), and no outliers were detected beyond expectation (frequency = 0, $p = .289$). Quantile regression could not be calculated for some quantiles due to a limited number of unique data points, but this does not affect the overall assessment of model adequacy.

However, the two-sided Kolmogorov–Smirnov test indicated a small but statistically significant deviation from the expected uniform distribution ($D = 0.043$, $p = .034$). One-sided tests suggested that this deviation was primarily in the lower tail of the distribution ($D^- = 0.043$, $p = .017$), whereas the upper tail did not significantly differ from expectation ($D^+ = 0.033$, $p = .095$). Closer inspection revealed that this slight deviation was associated with the Election Outcome variable (see Figures S3–S5). Treating this variable as either numeric or categorical produced the same results, suggesting that the observed deviation reflects the distribution of predicted versus observed values rather than a substantive model misfit.

Figure S2

National Model Diagnostic




Figure S3

Residuals by Collective Action Sum (z-score)




Figure S4

Residuals by Time





Figure S5

Residuals by National Election Outcome




Local Election Outcome

For the local model (see Figure S6), the dispersion test similarly indicated no over- or under-dispersion (dispersion = 0.992, $p = .854$), and no outliers were detected beyond expectation (frequency = 0, $p = .274$). Quantile regression could not be calculated for some quantiles due to a limited number of unique data points, but this did not compromise the overall assessment of model adequacy.

The two-sided Kolmogorov–Smirnov test indicated no significant deviation from the expected uniform distribution ($D = 0.039$, $p = .112$), and one-sided tests for the lower ($D^- = 0.039$, $p = .056$) and upper tails ($D^+ = 0.038$, $p = .072$) were also non-significant.

Figure S6

Local Model Diagnostic



Section 4: Analyses with Pre-Registered Measure of Trust

National Election Outcome

Table S6

Results of the Mixed Model with National Election Outcome on Pre-Registered Measure of Trust

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
Election outcome	0.22	0.06	.17	.08	.25	3.93	< .001
Time	0.13	0.03	.10	.06	.14	4.77	< .001
Collective action	0.09	0.05	.07	-.01	.15	1.70	.089
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.05	0.03	.04	-.002	.08	1.88	.061
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.13	0.05	.10	.02	.18	2.39	.017
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.03	-.01	-.05	.03	-0.65	.517
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.01	0.03	-.01	-.04	.03	-0.26	.799

Table S7

Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including National Election Outcome on Pre-registered Trust

Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (772)	<i>p</i>
Time: Pre-election	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.33	0.12	.26	.07	.44	2.74	.006
Time: Post-election	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.53	0.12	.41	.22	.59	4.35	<.001
Outcome: Losing	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.15	0.06	.12	.03	.20	2.68	.008
Outcome: Winning	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.35	0.09	.27	.13	.40	3.95	<.001
Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
Collective action: -1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.18	0.16	.14	-.10	.37	1.15	.250
Collective action: Mean	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.43	0.11	.33	.16	.50	3.93	<.001
Collective action: +1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.68	0.15	.52	.30	.74	4.62	<.001
Outcome: Losing	Collective action	-0.04	0.06	-.03	-.12	.06	-0.59	.557
Outcome: Winning	Collective action	0.22	0.09	.16	.04	.29	2.52	.012

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for—that is, Losing refers to non-Labour voters and Winning refers to Labour voters

Local Election Outcome

Table S8

Results of the Mixed Model with Local Election Outcome on Pre-Registered Measure of Trust

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Local outcome	0.23	0.06	.17	.09	.26	4.17	< .001
Time	0.11	0.03	.09	.05	.13	4.28	< .001
Collective action	0.08	0.05	.06	-.02	.14	1.51	.133
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.02	0.03	.01	-.03	.05	0.60	.547
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.09	0.05	.07	-.01	.15	1.71	.089
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.03	-.01	-.05	.03	-0.63	.530
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.03	0.03	-.03	-.06	.01	-1.24	.215

Table S9*Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including Local Election Outcome on Pre-registered Trust*

Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Collective action: -1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.18	0.16	.21	-.02	.44	1.79	.074
Collective action: Mean	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.43	0.11	.35	.18	.51	4.17	< .001
Collective action: +1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.68	0.15	.49	.26	.72	4.18	< .001
Outcome: Losing	Collective action	-0.01	0.07	-.01	-.12	.10	-0.14	.886
Outcome: Winning	Collective action	0.17	0.08	.13	.02	.25	2.23	.026

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for.

Section 5: Analyses with Ingroup Party Trust

National Election Outcome

Table S10

Results of the Mixed Model with National Election Outcome on Ingroup Party Trust

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
Election outcome	-0.004	0.05	-.003	-.09	.08	-0.08	.936
Time	0.06	0.02	.06	.02	.09	3.01	.003
Collective action	0.17	0.05	.15	.06	.23	3.51	< .001
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.09	0.02	.08	.04	.11	4.18	< .001
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.03	0.05	.03	-.06	.11	0.64	.523
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.02	-.01	-.05	.02	-0.83	.410
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.03	0.02	-.03	-.06	.01	-1.57	.116

Table S11*Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including National Election Outcome on Ingroup Party Trust*

Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (725)	<i>p</i>
Time: Pre-election	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	-0.19	0.11	-.16	-.34	.03	1.70	.090
Time: Post-election	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.17	0.11	.15	-.04	.33	1.55	.122
Outcome: Losing	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	-0.05	0.05	-.04	- .12	.03	1.08	.279
Outcome: Winning	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.30	0.07	.26	.14	.38	4.27	< .001

Local Election Outcome

Table S12

Results of the Mixed Model with Local Election Outcome on Ingroup Party Trust

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Local outcome	-0.06	0.05	-.05	-.14	.03	-1.23	.219
Time	0.04	0.02	.03	-.01	.07	1.61	.109
Collective action	0.14	0.05	.12	.04	.20	2.78	.005
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.03	0.02	.03	-.01	.07	1.52	.128
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	-0.10	0.05	-.08	-.17	-.002	-2.00	.046
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.004	0.02	-.004	-.04	.03	-0.20	.843
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.01	0.02	-.01	-.05	.03	-0.49	.627

Table S13

Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including Local Election Outcome on Ingroup Party Trust

Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Collective action: -1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.07	0.14	.06	-.18	.30	0.52	.607
Collective action: Mean	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	-0.12	0.10	-.11	-.28	.06	-1.23	.219
Collective action: +1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	-0.32	0.14	-.27	-.52	-.04	2.28	.023
Outcome: Losing	Collective action	0.23	0.07	.20	.09	.32	3.45	.001
Outcome: Winning	Collective action	0.04	0.07	.03	-.09	.15	0.55	.586

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for.

Section 6: Analyses with Covariates

National Election Outcome

Table S14

Results of the Mixed Model with National Election Outcome

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Gender (man vs. woman)	0.03	0.10	.02	-.13	.18	534	0.27	.790
Gender (man vs. other)	-0.25	0.57	-.21	-1.11	.70	534	-0.45	.655
Age	0.20	0.05	.16	.08	.24	553	3.81	< .001
British identification	0.24	0.04	.19	.13	.25	1070	6.15	< .001
Election outcome	0.23	0.06	.18	.10	.27	539	4.13	< .001
Time	0.14	0.02	.11	.09	.14	537	8.61	< .001
Collective action	0.02	0.05	.02	-.06	.10	534	0.42	.675
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.07	0.02	.06	.03	.08	537	4.41	< .001
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.11	0.05	.09	.01	.17	534	2.21	.027
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.02	-.01	-.04	.01	537	-1.13	.259
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.001	0.02	.001	-.03	.02	537	-0.07	.945

Table S15

Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including National Election Outcome and Covariates

Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Time: Pre-election	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.31	0.12	.25	.07	.43	634	2.72	.007
Time: Post-election	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.60	0.11	.48	.30	.66	632	5.22	< .001
Outcome: Losing	Time (Post-election - Pre-election)	0.14	0.03	.11	.05	.17	539	3.90	< .001
Outcome: Winning	Time (Post-election - Pre-election)	0.42	0.05	.34	.25	.43	537	7.72	< .001
Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Collective action: -1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.23	0.16	.19	-.06	.43	536	1.48	.140
Collective action: Mean	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.45	0.11	.37	.19	.54	540	4.13	< .001
Collective action: +1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.68	0.15	.55	.32	.78	539	4.70	< .001
Outcome: Losing	Collective action	-0.09	0.06	-.07	-.17	.02	534	-1.52	.130
Outcome: Winning	Collective action	0.13	0.08	.11	-.02	.24	535	1.62	.105

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for—that is, Losing refers to non-Labour voters and Winning refers to Labour voters

Local Election Outcome

Table S16

Results of the Mixed Model with Local Election Outcome and Covariates

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Gender (man vs. woman)	0.14	0.10	.11	-.06	.28	458	1.30	.194
Gender (man vs. other)	-0.03	0.65	-.03	-1.06	1.01	458	-0.05	.960
Age	0.18	0.05	.14	.06	.23	478	3.22	.001
British identification	0.27	0.04	.22	.15	.29	909	6.45	< .001
Local outcome	0.24	0.05	.20	.11	.28	463	4.49	< .001
Time	0.12	0.02	.10	.07	.13	462	7.34	< .001
Collective action	0.03	0.05	.02	-.06	.11	458	0.55	.585
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.05	0.02	.04	.02	.07	461	3.16	.002
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.06	0.05	.05	-.04	.13	458	1.13	.260
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.01	0.02	-.01	-.04	.01	461	-0.87	.386
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	0.03	0.02	.03	.00	.05	461	2.00	.046

Table S17

Simple Effect of Time (T2-T1) According to Local Outcome of the Election and Collective Action in Model with Covariates

Collective action	Local outcome	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
-1 <i>SD</i>	Losing	0.23	0.06	.19	.06	.32	461	3.80	.001
	Winning	0.31	0.07	.25	.11	.40	463	4.45	<.001
Mean	Losing	0.14	0.04	.11	.03	.20	462	3.35	.005
	Winning	0.35	0.05	.28	.17	.39	462	6.71	<.001
+1 <i>SD</i>	Losing	0.05	0.06	.04	-.09	.17	462	0.75	.876
	Winning	0.39	0.07	.31	.17	.46	461	5.54	<.001

Table S18

Simple Effect of Local Outcome of the Election (Winning - Losing) According to Time and Collective Action in Model with Covariates

Time	Collective action	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>df</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Pre-election	-1 <i>SD</i>	0.32	0.16	.26	-.06	.59	548	2.08	.162
	Mean	0.38	0.11	.30	-.07	.54	552	3.35	.005
	+1 <i>SD</i>	0.43	0.16	.35	.02	.67	554	2.75	.032
Post-election	-1 <i>SD</i>	0.41	0.16	.33	.002	.65	549	2.60	.048
	Mean	0.59	0.11	.48	.24	.71	553	5.23	<.001
	+1 <i>SD</i>	0.77	0.16	.62	.30	.95	553	4.85	<.001

Section 7: Analyses with National Election Outcome with Local Dataset

Table S19

Results of the Mixed Model with National Election Outcome (Local Dataset)

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Election outcome	0.11	0.06	.09	-.01	.18	1.87	.062
Time	0.13	0.02	.11	.08	.14	7.50	< .001
Collective action	0.002	0.06	.002	-.09	.09	0.004	.997
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.07	0.02	.06	.03	.09	4.01	< .001
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.13	0.06	.11	.02	.20	2.30	.022
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.02	-.01	-.04	.01	-1.05	.294
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.004	0.02	-.003	-.03	.02	-0.23	.822

Table S20

Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including National Election Outcome (Local Dataset)

Level of the Moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (547)	<i>p</i>
Time: Pre-election	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.08	0.12	.06	-.13	.26	0.63	.532
Time: Post-election	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.37	0.12	.30	.10	.49	2.95	.003
Outcome: Losing	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.13	0.04	.10	.04	.16	3.20	.002
Outcome: Winning	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.41	0.06	.33	.24	.43	6.87	< .001
Level of the Moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Collective action: -1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	-0.04	0.17	-.03	-.30	.24	-0.25	.805
Collective action: Mean	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.22	0.12	.18	-.01	.37	1.87	.063
Collective action: +1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.48	0.16	.39	.14	.65	3.03	.003
Outcome: Losing	Collective action	-0.13	0.07	-.11	-.21	.0002	-1.97	.050
Outcome: Winning	Collective action	0.13	0.09	.11	-.04	.26	1.41	.158

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for—that is, Losing refers to non-Labour voters and Winning refers to Labour voters

Section 8: Analyses with Dichotomous Score of Collective Action

National Election Outcome

Table S21

Results of the Mixed Model with National Election Outcome with Dichotomous Collective Action Score

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
Election outcome	0.07	0.07	.06	-.05	.16	1.05	.296
Time	0.14	0.02	.11	.08	.15	7.18	< .001
Collective action	-0.10	0.12	-.08	-.27	.11	-0.86	.390
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.07	0.02	.05	.02	.09	3.40	< .001
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.20	0.12	.16	-.03	.35	1.66	.097
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.04	-.02	-.07	.04	-0.58	.563
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	0.02	0.04	.02	-.04	.07	0.52	.603

Table S22

Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including National Election Outcome with Dichotomous Collective Action Score

Level of the Moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (631)	<i>p</i>
Time: Pre-election	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.19	0.13	.15	-.05	.35	1.50	.135
Time: Post-election	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.49	0.13	.40	.20	.59	3.93	< .001
Outcome: Losing	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.11	0.04	.09	.03	.15	2.80	.005
Outcome: Winning	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.41	0.06	.33	.24	.43	7.09	< .001
Level of the Moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
No collective action	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.14	0.13	.11	-.10	.33	1.05	.297
At least one collective action	Outcome (Winning - Losing)	0.54	0.20	.43	.12	.75	2.71	.007
Outcome: Losing	Collective action (At least one - No)	-0.30	0.13	-.24	-.46	-.03	-2.26	.024
Outcome: Winning	Collective action (At least one - No)	0.10	0.20	.08	-.24	.39	0.48	.630

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for—that is, Losing refers to non-

Labour voters and Winning refers to Labour voters

Local Election Outcome

Table S23

Results of the Mixed Model with Local Election Outcome with Dichotomous Collective Action Score

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Local outcome	0.12	0.07	.10	-.01	.20	1.79	.074
Time	0.12	0.02	.10	.06	.13	5.89	< .001
Collective action	-0.11	0.12	-.09	-.28	.11	-0.87	.384
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.04	0.02	.03	-.003	.06	1.79	.074
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.16	0.12	.13	-.07	.32	1.29	.199
Collective action $\times$ Time	0.001	0.04	.001	-.06	.06	0.04	.972
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	0.05	0.04	.04	-.02	.10	1.35	.178

Table S24

Simple Effect of Time (Post-election - Pre-election) According to Local Election Outcome and Dichotomous Collective Action Score

Collective action	Local outcome	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
No collective action	Losing	0.16	0.05	.13	.05	.21	3.21	.001
	Winning	0.31	0.06	.25	.15	.35	4.99	< .001
At least one collective action	Losing	0.06	0.07	.05	-.07	.17	0.87	.387
	Winning	0.41	0.10	.33	.17	.50	4.00	< .001

Table S25

Simple Effect of Local Outcome of the Election (Winning - Losing) According to Time and Dichotomous Collective Action Score

Time	Collective action	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (548)	<i>p</i>
Pre-election	No collective action	0.16	0.14	.13	-.09	.35	1.19	.236
	At least one collective action	0.38	0.22	.31	-.04	.65	1.73	.084
Post-election	No collective action	0.31	0.14	.25	.03	.47	2.23	.026
	At least one collective action	0.72	0.22	.59	.24	.93	3.32	.001

Section 9: Analyses with Rasch Score of Collective Action

National Election Outcome

Table S26

Results of the Mixed Model with National Election Outcome with Rasch Score of Collective Action

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
Election outcome	0.13	0.06	.10	.01	.19	2.27	.023
Time	0.14	0.02	.11	.08	.14	8.29	< .001
Collective action	-0.03	0.05	-.03	-.11	.06	-0.59	.555
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.07	0.02	.06	.03	.09	4.47	< .001
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.12	0.05	.10	.02	.18	2.33	.020
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.02	0.02	-.01	-.04	.01	-0.96	.338
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	0.003	0.02	.003	-.02	.03	0.20	.841

Table S27

Simple Effects of Interactions in the Model Including National Election Outcome with the Rasch Score of Collective Action

Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (631)	<i>p</i>
Time: Pre-election	Outcome (Wining-Losing)	0.11	0.12	.09	-.10	.27	0.92	.357
Time: Post-election	Outcome (Wining-Losing)	0.40	0.12	.32	.14	.51	3.44	< .001
Outcome: Losing	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.13	0.04	.10	.04	.16	3.54	< .001
Outcome: Winning	Time (Post-election – Pre-election)	0.42	0.05	.34	.25	.42	7.58	< .001
Level of the moderator	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (539)	<i>p</i>
Collective action: -1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Winning-Losing)	0.01	0.16	.01	-.25	.26	-0.04	.968
Collective action: Mean	Outcome (Wining-Losing)	0.25	0.11	.20	.03	.38	2.27	.024
Collective action: +1 <i>SD</i>	Outcome (Wining-Losing)	0.50	0.15	.40	.17	.64	3.35	.001
Outcome: Losing	Collective action	-0.15	0.06	-.12	-.22	-.02	-2.46	.014
Outcome: Winning	Collective action	0.09	0.08	.07	-.06	.21	1.08	.279

Note. When Outcome does not interact with Time, it should be interpreted as the party the participant voted for—that is, Losing refers to non-Labour voters and Winning refers to Labour voters.

Local Election Outcome

Table S28

Results of the Mixed Model with Local Election Outcome with the Rasch Score of Collective Action

Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
Local outcome	0.17	0.06	.13	.05	.22	2.99	.003
Time	0.12	0.02	.09	.07	.12	6.93	< .001
Collective action	-0.04	0.05	-.03	-.12	.06	-0.66	.510
Outcome $\times$ Time	0.05	0.02	.04	.01	.07	2.99	.003
Outcome $\times$ Collective action	0.08	0.05	.06	-.03	.15	1.40	.163
Collective action $\times$ Time	-0.01	0.02	-.01	-.03	.02	-0.55	.581
Outcome $\times$ Collective action $\times$ Time	0.03	0.02	.03	.00	.05	1.95	.052

Table S29

Simple Effect of Time (T2-T1) According to Local Outcome of the Election and Rasch Score of Collective Action

Collective action	Local outcome	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (463)	<i>p</i>
-1 <i>SD</i>	Losing	0.22	0.06	.17	.05	.30	3.53	.003
	Winning	0.29	0.07	.23	.08	.38	4.01	<.001
Mean	Losing	0.13	0.04	.11	.02	.20	3.16	.009
	Winning	0.33	0.05	.27	.16	.38	6.35	<.001
+1 <i>SD</i>	Losing	0.05	0.06	.04	-.08	.17	.82	.843
	Winning	0.38	0.07	.31	.16	.46	5.26	<.001

Table S30

Simple Effect of Local Outcome of the Election (Winning - Losing) According to Time and Rasch Score of Collective Action

Time	Collective action	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β	95% CI		<i>t</i> (548)	<i>p</i>
Pre-election	-1 <i>SD</i>	0.14	0.16	.12	-.22	.45	0.88	.814
	Mean	0.23	0.12	.19	-.06	.43	1.99	.194
	+1 <i>SD</i>	0.32	0.16	.26	-.08	.60	1.96	.207
Post-election	-1 <i>SD</i>	0.22	0.16	.17	-.16	.51	1.33	.545
	Mean	0.43	0.12	.35	.11	.59	3.73	.001
	+1 <i>SD</i>	0.65	0.16	.52	.19	.86	3.99	<.001